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Abstract. This paper provides an overview of the state of the art in
the design of cryptographic algorithms. It reviews the di®erent type of
algorithms for encryption and authentication and explains the principles
of stream ciphers, block ciphers, hash functions, public-key encryption
algorithms, and digital signature schemes. Subsequently the design and
evaluation procedures for cryptographic algorithms are discussed.
1 Introduction
In our society, digital information and the systems and networks carrying this
information are abused under many forms: ¯nancial transactions are eaves-
dropped or modi¯ed, sensitive information of individuals and organizations is
eavesdropped or stolen, electronic services are used without paying for them,
and computer systems and networks are broken into or brought down. The tools
to perform this vary from simple bugs, password sni®ers, and password crackers,
over malicious software such as viruses and malicious applets, to complete hacker
workbenches. Traditionally computer networks existed within one organization,
and one tried to defend them against an opponent that came from outside the
system. Now that we move to open and global networks, and that we are entering
an era of electronic commerce, a more complex threat model arises: we cannot
even trust the parties we are dealing with, and the system has to be designed
to ¯ght fraud within the system. For example, in an electronic transaction sys-
tem, sellers can deny having sent an order if it turns out badly, and traders can
deny having received an order when it turns out pro¯table (in order to keep the
money). The risk for misuse has increased considerably, as potential attackers
can operate from all over the globe. Moreover, if someone gains access to an
electronic information system, the scale and impact of the abuse can be much
larger than in a paper-based system.
These risks create the need for adequate security measures to protect elec-
tronic information systems. It is clear that in an electronic world physical security
or personnel security by itself cannot be su±cient. An essential component of
every secure information system is formed by cryptographic techniques. Other
important building blocks are secure operating systems and procedural aspects
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such as audit tools and management guidelines. Building secure computer sys-
tems and networks requires a conservative approach which is not always compat-
ible with the current rapid developments in the industry; moreover, that security
has to be kept in mind from the ¯rst step of the design.
In this paper we discuss the principles underlying the design of cryptographic
algorithms; we distinguish between con¯dentiality protection (the protection
against passive eavesdroppers) and authentication (the protection against ac-
tive eavesdroppers, who try to modify information). Then we review the di®er-
ent issues that arise when selecting, designing, and evaluating a cryptographic
algorithm. Finally we present some concluding remarks.
2 Encryption for Secrecy Protection
The use of cryptography for protection the secrecy of information is as old as
writing itself (for an excellent historical overview, see D. Kahn [14]). The basic
idea is to apply a `complicated' transformation to the information to be pro-
tected. When the sender (usually called Alice in cryptography) wants to send
a message to the recipient (Bob), she will apply to the plaintext P the math-
ematical transformation E(). This transformation E() is called the encryption
algorithm; the result of this transformation is called the ciphertext or C = E(P).
Bob will decrypt C by applying the inverse transformation D = E¡1; this way
he recovers P or P = D(C). For a secure algorithm E, the ciphertext C does
not make sense to outsiders: Eve, who is tapping the connection, can obtain C,
but she cannot obtain (partial information on) the corresponding plaintext P.
This approach only works when Bob can keep the transformation D secret.
While this is acceptable for a person-to-person exchange, it is not feasible for
large scale use. Bob needs a software or hardware implementation of D: either
he has to program it himself, or he has to trust someone to write the program
for him. Moreover, he will need a di®erent transformation (and program) for
each correspondent, which is not very practical. Bob and Alice always have to
face the risk that somehow Eve will obtain D (or E), for example by bribing
the author of the software or their system manager, or by breaking into their
computer system.
This problem can be solved by introducing into the encryption algorithm
E() a secret parameter, the key K. Typically such a key is a binary string of
40 to a few thousand bits. A corresponding key K¤ is used for the decryption
algorithm D. One has thus C = EK(P) and P = DK¤(C) (see also Figure 1,
which assumes that K¤ = K). The transformation has to depend strongly (and
in a very complicated way) on the keys: if one uses a wrong key K¤0 6= K¤, one
does not obtain the plaintext P but a `random' plaintext P 0. Now it is possible
to publish the encryption algorithm E() and the decryption algorithm D(); the
security of the system relies only on the secrecy of two short keys. This implies
that E() and D() can be evaluated publicly and distributed on a commercial
basis. One can think of the analogy with a mechanical lock: everyone knows how
such a lock works, but in order to open a particular lock, one needs to know the
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key or the secret combination. The assumption that the algorithm is known to
the opponent is known in cryptography as \Kerckho®s's principle"; Kerckho®s
was a 19th century Dutch cryptographer who was the ¯rst to formulate this
approach.
A simple example of an encryption algorithm is the so-called `Caesar cipher,'
after the Roman emperor who used it. The plaintext is encrypted letter by letter;
the ciphertext is obtained by shifting the letters over a ¯xed number of positions
in the alphabet. The secret key indicates the number of positions. It is claimed
that Caesar always used the value of three, such that \an example" would
be encrypted to \dq hadpsoh". Another example is the name of the computer
\hal" from S. Kubrick's \A Space Odyssey (2001)", which was obtained by
replacing the letters of \ibm" by their predecessor in the alphabet. This corre-
sponds to a shift over 25 positions. It is clear that such a system is completely
insecure.
A problem which has not yet been addressed is how Alice and Bob exchange
the secret key. The easy answer is that cryptography does not solve this problem;
cryptography only makes problems easier. In this case the secrecy of a (large)
plaintext has been reduced to that of two short keys, which can be exchanged
on beforehand. The problem of exchanging keys is studied in more detail in an



















Fig.1. Model for conventional or symmetric encryption
The branch of science which studies the encryption of information is called
cryptography. A related branch tries to `break' encryption algorithms, by recov-
ering the plaintext without knowing the key or by deriving the key from the
ciphertext and parts of the plaintext; it is called cryptanalysis. The term cryp-
tology covers both aspects. For more extensive introductions to cryptography,
the reader is referred to [2,15,19,20,25,26].
Thus far we have assumed that the key for decryption K¤ is equal to the
encryption key K, or that it is easy to derive K¤ from K. This type of algo-
rithms are called conventional or symmetric ciphers. In public-key or asymmetric
ciphers, K¤ and K are always di®erent; moreover, it should be di±cult to com-
pute K¤ from K. This has the advantage that one can make K public, which
has important implications to the key management problem. The remainder of
this section discusses conventional algorithms and public-key algorithms.
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2.1 Conventional Encryption
This section introduces the two most common conventional encryption algo-
rithms: additive stream ciphers and block ciphers.
Additive Stream Ciphers. Additive stream ciphers are ciphers for which the
encryption consists of a modulo 2 addition (exclusive or, exor) of a key stream to
the plaintext (see Figure 2). The plaintext and ciphertext are divided into words
of m bits (m is typically 1, 8, or a multiple of 8), and the ith word of the plaintext,
ciphertext, and key stream is denoted with pi, ci, and ki, respectively. The
encryption operation can then be written as ci = pi©ki. Here © denotes addition
modulo 2. The decryption operation is identical to the encryption (the cipher is
an involution): indeed, pi = ci©ki = (pi©ki)©ki = pi©(ki©ki) = pi©0 = pi.
It is clear that the m-bit key stream word ki cannot be a constant (in that case
a cryptanalyst can compute the key stream word from a single ciphertext word
and the corresponding plaintext word; also repetitions in the plaintext would be
visible in the ciphertext). One can show that for a strong cipher the sequence of
ki has to consist of randomly looking strings (see also Sect. 2.2).
In practice one computes the words ki with a ¯nite state machine. Such a
machine stretches a short secret key K into a much longer key stream sequence
ki; this is called a pseudo-random string generator. The sequence ki is eventually
periodic. One important (but not su±cient) design criterion for the ¯nite state
machine is that the period has to be su±cient long (264 is a typical lower bound).
The values ki should also be uniformly distributed; another condition is that
there should be no correlations between (part of) successive words (note that
cryptanalytic attacks exist which exploit correlations of less than 1 in 1 million).
Formally, the sequence ki can be parameterized with a security parameter; then
on requires that the sequence satis¯es every polynomial time statistical test
for randomness (here polynomial means polynomial in the security parameter).
Another desirable property is that no polynomial time machine can predict the
next bit of the sequence (based on the previous outputs) with a probability that
is signi¯cantly better than 1/2. An important (and perhaps surprising) result
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Fig.2. An additive stream cipher
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Block Ciphers. Block ciphers take a di®erent approach to encryption: the
plaintext is divided into larger words of n bits, called blocks. Every block is enci-
phered in the same way, using a keyed one-way permutation, i.e., a permutation
on the set of n-bit strings that is controlled by a secret key. The simplest way to
encrypt a plaintext using a block cipher is as follows: divide the plaintext into
n-bit blocks, and encrypt these block by block. The decryption also operates on
individual blocks:
ci = EK(pi) and pi = DK(ci):
This way of using a block cipher is called the ECB (Electronic CodeBook) mode.
Note that the encryption operation does not depend on the location in the
ciphertext as is the case for additive stream ciphers.
Consider the following attack on a block cipher (the so-called tabulation at-
tack): the cryptanalyst collects ciphertext blocks and their corresponding plain-
text blocks (this is possible as part of the plaintext is often predictable); this is
used to build a large table. With such a table, one can deduce information on
other plaintexts encrypted under the same key. In order to preclude this attack,
the value of n has to be quite large (e.g., 64 or 128) and the plaintext should
not contain any repetitions (or other patterns), as these will be leaked to the
ciphertext.
This shows that even if n is large, the ECB mode is not suited to encrypt
plaintexts that are not random (such as text, images, etc.). This mode should
only be used in very special cases, where the plaintext is already random, such as
the encryption of cryptographic keys. There is however an easy way to randomize
the plaintext, by using the block cipher in a di®erent mode of operation.
The default mode of operation for a block cipher is the CBC (Cipher Block
Chaining) mode. In this mode the di®erent blocks are coupled by adding modulo
2 to a plaintext block the previous ciphertext block:
ci = EK(pi © ci¡1) and pi = DK(ci) © ci¡1 :
Note that this `randomizes' the plaintext, and hides patterns. To enable the
encryption of the ¯rst plaintext block (i = 1), one de¯nes c0 as the initial value
IV . By varying this value, one can ensure that the same plaintext is encrypted
into a di®erent ciphertext under the same key. The CBC mode allows for random
access on decryption: if necessary, one can decrypt only a small part of the
ciphertext.
It is also possible to use a block cipher as an additive stream cipher by feeding
the output back to the input; this mode is known as the OFB (Output FeedBack)
mode. A second stream mode is the CFB (Cipher FeedBack) mode; it has better
synchronization properties. The modes of operation have been standardized in
[6,11].
This section has illustrated that a block cipher forms a very °exible building
block. The most famous block cipher is the Data Encryption Standard (or DES)
[5], which is widely used since 1977. The DES has a block size of 64 bits and a
key length of 56 bits; it will be shown in Sect. 4.3 that this is no longer su±cient.
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Therefore the US government is planning to replace it by a new block cipher,
the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). Hereto an open call for algorithms
has been launched in September '97; 15 candidates have been submitted by the
deadline of June '98. Currently the evaluation procedure is under way. The AES
will have a block length of 128 bits and a key length between 128 and 256 bits.
2.2 Security of Conventional Algorithms
An essential aspect in the choice of an encryption algorithm is the security level.
In 1926 G.S. Vernam has published a simple encryption algorithm for telegraphic
messages [27]. The cipher is an additive stream cipher, where the key stream
consists of a completely random sequence, generated by a binary symmetric
source (all bits are uniformly and identically distributed). In 1949 C. Shannon,
the father of information theory, was able to prove mathematically that this
scheme o®ers perfect security, i.e., from observing the ciphertext, the opponent
cannot obtain any information on the plaintext, no matter how much computing
power he has [24]. The main disadvantage of this scheme is that the secret key is
exactly as long as the message (one should never reuse a key stream); C. Shannon
also showed that this the best one can do if one wants perfect security. In spite
of the long key, the Vernam algorithm is still used by diplomats and spies; it has
been used for the `red telephone' between Washington and Moscow. Spies used
to carry key pads with random characters (it is easy to generalize the scheme
to arbitrary alphabets). The security of the scheme relies on the fact that every
page of the pad is used only once, which explains the name \one-time pad".
In most commercial applications one cannot a®ord to distribute keys which
are as long as the plaintext. Therefore one uses encryption algorithms which do
not o®er perfect security; this implies that it is in principle possible to recover
the plaintext and/or the secret key from the ciphertext, in the sense that one
has su±cient information to do this. This does not mean that it is also possible
in practice. For example, additive stream ciphers try to mimic the approach of
the Vernam scheme by replacing the random key stream sequence by a pseudo-
random sequence generated from a short key.
2.3 Public-Key Encryption
The main problem that is left unsolved by conventional cryptography is the key
distribution problem. Especially in a large network it is not feasible to distribute
keys between all user pairs (in a network with t users there are t(t ¡ 1)=2 such
pairs). An alternative is to manage all keys in a central location, but this may
then become a single point of failure. Public-key cryptography o®ers a much
more elegant solution to this problem.
The concept of public-key cryptography has been invented by in 1976, inde-
pendently by W. Di±e and M. Hellman [3] and by R. Merkle [18]. The key idea
behind public-key cryptography is the concept of trapdoor one-way functions.
A one-way function is a function that is easy to compute, but hard to invert.
For example, in a conventional block cipher, the ciphertext has to be a one-way
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function of the plaintext and the key: it is easy to compute the ciphertext from
the plaintext and the key, but given the plaintext and the ciphertext it should
be hard to recover the key (otherwise the block cipher would not be secure).
Similarly one can show that the existence of additive stream ciphers (pseudo-
random string generators) implies the existence of one-way functions. Trapdoor
one-way functions are one-way function with an additional property: given some
additional information (the trapdoor), it becomes possible to invert the one-way
function.
With such functions Bob can send a secret message to Alice without the need
for prior arrangement of a secret key. Alice chooses a trapdoor one-way function
with public parameter PA (Alice's public key) and with secret parameter SA
(Alice's secret key). Alice makes her public key widely available (she can put it
on her home page, but it can also be included in special directories). Anyone who
wants to send some con¯dential information to Alice, computes the ciphertext
as the image of the plaintext under the trapdoor one-way function using the
parameter PA. Upon receipt of this ciphertext, Alice recovers the plaintext by
using her trapdoor information SA (see Figure 3). An attacker, who does not
know SA, sees only the image of the plaintext under a one-way function, and
will not be able to recover the plaintext. This assumes that it is infeasible to
compute SA from PA. Note that if one wants to send a message to Alice, one
has to know Alice's public key PA, and one has to be sure that this key really
belongs to Alice (and not to Eve), since it is only the owner of the corresponding
secret key who will be able to decrypt the ciphertext. Public keys do not need
a secure channel for their distribution, but they do need an authentic channel.
As the keys for encryption and decryption are di®erent, and Alice and Bob






















Fig.3. Model for public-key or asymmetric encryption
The conditions which a public-key encryption algorithm has to satisfy are:
- the generation of a key pair (PA;SA) has to be easy;
- encryption and decryption have to be easy operations;
- it should be hard to compute the public key PA from the corresponding
secret key SA;
- SA(PA(P)) = P.
Designing a secure public-key encryption algorithm is apparently a very dif-
¯cult problem. From the large number of proposals, only a few have survived
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(for example, almost all knapsack-based systems have been broken). The most
popular algorithm is the RSA algorithm [22], which was named after its inven-
tors (R.L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman). The security of RSA is based
on the fact that it is relatively simple to ¯nd two large prime numbers (in 1998
large means 115 decimal digits or more) and to multiply these, while factoring
their product (of 230 decimal digits) is not feasible with the current algorithms
and computers.
key generation: Find 2 prime numbers p and q with at least 115 digits and
compute their product, the modulus n = p ¢ q. Compute the Carmichael
function ¸(n), the least common multiple of p ¡ 1 and q ¡ 1. Choose an
encryption exponent e (at least 40 to 64 bits long), which is relatively prime
to ¸(n) and compute the decryption exponent as d = e¡1 mod ¸(n) (with
Euclid's algorithm). The public key consists of the pair (e;n), and the secret
key consists of the decryption exponent d or the pair (p;q);
encryption: represent the plaintext as an integer in the interval [0;n ¡ 1] and
compute the ciphertext as C = P e mod n;
decryption: P = Cd mod n.
Without explaining the mathematical background of the algorithm, one can ob-
serve that decryption requires the extraction of modular eth roots; no algorithm
is known for this problem which does not use the prime factors of n; ¯nding the
decryption exponent requires knowledge of ¸(n) and hence of the factors of n.
On the other hand, this knowledge is not required for the encryption operation.
For the practical use of RSA, one has to take into account many technical de-
tails: for example, the plaintext P has to be mapped (with a function that is
easy to invert) to a random integer 2 [0;n ¡ 1] in order to avoid trivial attacks
(e.g., the extraction of natural eth roots when P e < n).
The more complex properties of public-key cryptography seem to require
some `high level' mathematical structure; most public-key algorithms are based
on number theoretic problems (such as factoring and discrete logarithm in cer-
tain groups). While these number theoretic problems are believed to be di±cult,
it should be noted that since the invention of public-key cryptography signi¯-
cant progress has been made in factoring: the factorization record in 1975 was
39 decimal digits; in 1985 this was increased to 65 digits, and in 1994 a 130-digit
modulus was factored. This evolution is due to a combination of more sophis-
ticated factoring algorithms with progress in hardware and parallel processing.
The cryptographer should take this into account by selecting su±ciently large
keys for public-key algorithms.
The main advantage of public-key algorithms is the simpli¯ed key manage-
ment. The main disadvantages are the larger keys (typically 64 to 256 bytes)
and the slow performance: both in software and hardware public-key encryp-
tion algorithms are two to three orders of magnitude slower than conventional
algorithms. For example, a 1024-bit exponentiation requires about 0.3 seconds
on a 90 MHz Pentium, which corresponds to 3.4 kbit/s. On the same machine,
DES runs at 16.9 Mbit/s. Because of the large di®erence in performance and the
larger block length (which in°uences error propagation), one always employs
Appeared in SOFSEM 1998: 25th Conference on Current Trends in Theory and
Practice of Informatics, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1521, B. Rovan (ed.),
Springer-Verlag, pp. 204{221, 1998.
c °1998 Springer-Verlag9
hybrid systems: the public-key encryption scheme is used to distribute a secret
key, which is then used in a fast conventional algorithm.
3 Hashing and Signatures for Authentication
Information authentication includes two main aspects:
- data origin authentication, or who has originated the information;
- data integrity, or has the information been modi¯ed.
Other aspects which can be important are the timeliness of the information, the
sequence of messages, and the destination of information. These aspects can be
accounted for by using sequence numbers and time stamps in the messages and
by including addressing information in the data. In data communications, the
implicit authentication created by recognition of the handwriting, signature, or
voice disappears. The reason is that information becomes much more vulnerable
to falsi¯cation as the physical coupling between information and its bearer is
lost.
Until recently it was widely believed that encryption of information (with a
conventional algorithm) was su±cient for protecting its authenticity. The rea-
soning was that if a certain ciphertext resulted after decryption in a meaningful
plaintext, it had to be created by someone who knew the key, and therefore it
must be authentic. A few counterexamples are su±cient to refute this claim: if
a block cipher is used in ECB mode, an attacker can always reorder the blocks.
For any additive stream cipher (including the Vernam scheme), an opponent can
always modify any plaintext bit (without knowing whether a 0 has been changed
to a 1 or vice versa). The concept `meaningful' information implicitly assumes
that the information contains redundancy, which allows to distinguish genuine
information from an arbitrary plaintext. However, one can envisage applications
where the plaintext contains very little or no redundancy. The separation be-
tween secrecy and authentication has also been clari¯ed by public-key cryptog-
raphy: anyone who knows Alice's public key can send her a con¯dential message,
and therefore Alice has no idea who has actually sent this message.
Two di®erent levels of information authentication can be distinguished. If
two parties trust each other and want to protect themselves against malicious
outsiders, the term `conventional message authentication' is used. In this setting,
both parties are at equal footing (for example, they share the same secret key).
If however a dispute arises between them, a third party (such as a judge) will
not be able to resolve it (for example a judge cannot tell whether a message has
been created by Alice or by Bob). If protection between two mutually distrustful
parties is required (which is often the case in commercial relationships), an elec-
tronic equivalent of a manual signature is needed. In cryptographic terms this is
called a digital signature.
3.1 Symmetric Authentication
The underlying idea is similar to that for encryption, where the secrecy of a
large amount of information is replaced by the secrecy of a short key. In the
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case of authentication, one replaces the authenticity of the information by the
protection of a short string, which is a unique `¯ngerprint' of the information.
Such a `¯ngerprint' is computed as a hash result. This can also be interpreted as
adding a special form of redundancy to the information. This process consists of
two components. First one compresses the information to a string of ¯xed length,
with a (cryptographic) hash function. Then the resulting string (the hash result)
is protected as follows:
- either the hash result is communicated over an authentic channel (e.g., it can
be read over the phone). It is then su±cient to use a hash function without
a secret parameter, which is called a Manipulation Detection Code or MDC;
- or the hash function uses a secret parameter (the key); it is then called a
Message Authentication Code or MAC.
MDCs. If an additional (authentic) channel is available, MDCs can provide
authenticity without requiring secret keys. Moreover an MDC is a °exible prim-
itive, which can be used for a variety of other cryptographic applications. An
MDC has to satisfy the following conditions:
- it should be hard to ¯nd an input with a given hash result (preimage resis-
tance);
- it should be hard to ¯nd a second input with the same hash result as a given
input (2nd preimage resistance);
- it should be hard to ¯nd two di®erent inputs with the same hash result
(collision resistance).
An MDC satisfying these three conditions is called a collision resistant hash
function. For a strong hash function with an n-bit result, solving one of the ¯rst
two problems requires about 2n evaluations of the hash function. This implies
that n = 64:::80 is su±cient. However, ¯nding collisions is much easier: one
will ¯nd with high probability a collision in a set of hash results corresponding
to 2n=2 inputs. This implies that collision resistant hash functions need a hash
result of 128 to 160 bits. This last property is also known as the birthday paradox
based on the following observation: within a group of 24 persons the probability
that there are two persons with the same birthday is about 50%. The reason
is that a group of this size contains 276 di®erent pairs of persons, which is a
large fraction of the 365 days in a year. Note that the birthday paradox plays
an essential role in the security of many cryptographic primitives (cf. Sect. 4.3).
Examples of MDCs in use today are RIPEMD-160 and SHA-1; both have been
standardized in [12]. Not all applications need collision resistant hash functions;
sometimes (2nd) preimage resistance is su±cient.
MACs. MACs have been used for more than twenty years in electronic trans-
actions in the banking environment. They require the exchange of a secret key
between the communicating parties. The MAC corresponding to a message is a
complex function of every bit of the message and every bit of the key; it should
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be infeasible to derive the key from observing a number of text/MAC pairs, or
to compute or predict a MAC without knowing the secret key.
A MAC is used as follows: Alice computes for her message P the value
MACK(P) and appends this MAC to the message (here MAC denotes both
the function and its result). Bob recomputes the value of MACK(P) based on
the received message P, and veri¯es whether it matches the received MAC. If
the answer is positive, he accepts the message as authentic, i.e., as a genuine
message from Alice. Eve, the active eavesdropper, can modify the message P to
P0, but she is not able to compute the corresponding MAC value MAC(P 0), as
she is not privy to the secret key K. For a secure MAC, the best Eve can do is
guessing the MAC. In that case, Bob can detect the modi¯cation with high prob-
ability: for an n-bit MAC Eve's probability of success is only 1=2n. The value of
n lies typically between 32 and 64. Note that if encryption and authentication
are combined, the key for encryption and authentication need to be di®erent.
Moreover, the preferred option is to compute the MAC on the plaintext.
A popular way to compute a MAC is to encrypt the message with a block
cipher using the CBC mode (yet another use of a block cipher), and to keep
only part of the bits of the last block as the MAC. However, recent research has
indicated that this approach is less secure than previously believed [21]; again,
the birthday paradox plays a role in this work.
For a MAC, the equivalent of the Vernam scheme exists. This implies that
one can design a MAC algorithm which is unconditionally secure, in the sense
that the security of the MAC is independent of the computing power of the op-
ponent. The requirement is again that the secret key is used only once. The basic
idea of this approach is due to G.J. Simmons and dates back to the seventies
(see for example [25]). It turns out that these algorithms can be computationally
very e±cient, since the properties required from this primitive are combinato-
rial rather than cryptographic. Recent constructions are therefore one order of
magnitude faster than other cryptographic primitives (encryption algorithms,
hash functions), and achieve speeds up to 1 Gbit/s on fast processors [9]. A
simple example is described here, which is derived from Reed-Solomon codes for
error-correction [13]. The key consists of two n-bit words denoted with K1 and
K2. The plaintext is divided into t n-bit words, denoted with p1 through pt.
The MAC, which consists of a single n-bit word, is computed based on a simple
polynomial evaluation:
MACK1;K2(x) = K1 +
t X
i=1
pi ¢ (K2)i ;
where addition and multiplication are to be computed in the ¯nite ¯eld with
2n elements. It can be proved that the probability of creating another valid
message/MAC pair is upper bounded by t=2n. A practical choice is n = 64, which
results in a 128-bit key. For messages up to 1 Mbyte, the success probability of
a forgery is then less than 1=247. Note that it turns out to be possible to reuse
K2; however, for every message a new key K1 is required. This key could be
generated from a short initial key using an additive stream cipher, but then
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the unconditional security is lost. However, one can argue that it is easier to
understand the security of this scheme than that of a computationally secure
MAC.
3.2 Digital Signatures
A digital signature is the electronic equivalent of a manual signature on a doc-
ument. It provides a strong binding between the document and a person, and
in case of a dispute, a third party can decide whether or not the signature is
valid. Of course a digital signature will not bind a person and a document, but
will bind a key and a document. Additional measures are then required to bind
the person to his or her key. Note that for a MAC, both Alice and Bob can
compute the MAC, hence a third party cannot distinguish between them. While
block ciphers (and even one-way functions) can be used to construct digital sig-
natures, the most elegant and e±cient constructions for digital signature rely on
public-key cryptography.
If Alice wants to sign some information P intended for Bob, she adds some
redundancy to the information, resulting in ~ P, and decrypts the resulting text
with her secret key. This operation can only be carried out by Alice. Upon
receipt of the signature, Bob encrypts it using Alice's public key, and veri¯es
that the information ~ P has the prescribed redundancy. If so, he accepts the
signature on P as valid. Such a digital signature (which is a signature with
`message recovery') imposes an additional condition on the public-key system:
PA(SA(P)) = P. Note that anyone who knows Alice's public key can verify the
signature. The RSA public-key encryption scheme is a bijection (a trapdoor one-
way permutation), and thus it allows for the construction of digital signatures
with message recovery. We leave it as an exercise to the reader to show why the
redundancy is essential in this approach.
If Alice wants to sign very long messages (without encrypting them), this
approach results in signatures that are as long as the message. Moreover, signing
with a public-key system is a relatively slow operation. In order to solve these
problems, Alice does not sign the information itself, but the hash result of the
information computed with an MDC. The signature now consists of a single
block, which is appended to the information (this is called a digital signature
`with appendix'). In order to verify such a signature, Bob recomputes the MDC of
the message and encrypts the signature with Alice's public key. If both operations
give the same result, Bob accepts the signature as valid. MDCs used in this way
need to be collision resistant: otherwise Alice can sign a message P, and later
be held accountable for a fraudulent message P 0 with the same MDC (and thus
with the same signature).
Note that there exist other signature schemes with appendix (such as the
DSA [7]), which are not derived immediately from a public-key encryption
scheme. For these schemes one can de¯ne a `signing operation' (using the se-
cret key) and a `veri¯cation operation' (using the public key), without referring
to `decryption' and `encryption' operations.
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4 Analysis and Design of Conventional Cryptographic
Algorithms
In this section we compare three approaches to the design of cryptographic
algorithms. Next we describe the typical phases in the life of an algorithm. Then
we contrast brute force and shortcut attacks, public and secret algorithms, and
weak and strong algorithms.
4.1 Three Approaches in Cryptography
Present day cryptology tries to develop provably secure and e±cient crypto-
graphic algorithms. Often such algorithms are not available; therefore cryp-
tographic algorithms are studied following three approaches: the information
theoretic approach, the complexity theoretic approach, and the system based
approach. These approaches di®er in the assumptions about the capabilities of
an opponent, in the de¯nition of a cryptanalytic success, and in the notion of
security.
The most desirable from the viewpoint of the cryptographer are uncondition-
ally secure algorithms; this design approach is also known as the information
theoretic approach. However, few such schemes exist: examples are the Vernam
scheme (Sect. 2.2), and the MAC based on Reed-Solomon codes (Sect. 3.1). While
they are computationally very e±cient, the cost in terms of key material may
be prohibitively large (certainly for the Vernam scheme). For most applications
one has to live with schemes which o®er only conditional security.
A second approach is to reduce the security of his scheme to that of other
well known di±cult problems, or to that of other cryptographic primitives. The
complexity theoretic approach starts from an abstract model for computation,
and assumes that the opponent has limited computing power within this model
[8]. This approach has many positive sides:
{ It forces the formulation of exact de¯nitions, and to state clearly the security
properties and assumptions.
{ Once the proofs are written down, anyone can verify them and decide whether
or not they are correct.
However, this approach also has some limitations:
{ Many cryptographic applications need building blocks, such are one-way
functions, one-way permutations, and pseudo-random functions, which can-
not be reduced to other primitives. In terms of the existence of such primi-
tives, complexity theory has only very weak results: in non-uniform complex-
ity (Boolean circuits) the best proved thus far is that there exist functions
which are twice as hard to invert as to compute, which is far too weak to be
of any use in cryptography [10].
{ Sometimes the resulting scheme is not very e±cient, or the security reduction
is quite loose: for example, the correct properties are proved, but the proof
is only asymptotic and gives no indication of the exact security level for a
concrete instance.
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This implies that for many instances, the cryptographer has to rely on the
system-based or practical approach. This approach tries to produce practical so-
lutions; the security estimates are based on the best algorithm known to break
the system and on realistic estimates of the necessary computing power or dedi-
cated hardware to carry out the algorithm. By trial and error procedures, several
cryptanalytic principles have emerged, and it is the goal of the designer to avoid
attacks based on these principles. The second aspect is to design building blocks
with provable properties, and to assemble such basic building blocks to design
cryptographic primitives.
4.2 Life Cycle of a Cryptographic Algorithm
A cryptographic algorithm usually starts with a new idea of a cryptographer.
A ¯rst step should always consist of an evaluation of the resulting algorithm, in
which the cryptographer tries to determine whether or not the scheme is secure. If
the scheme is unconditionally secure, he has to write the proofs, and to convince
himself that the model is correct and matches the application. For computational
security, it is again very important to write down security proofs, and to check
these for subtle °aws. Moreover, one has to assess whether the assumptions
behind the proofs are realistic. For the system-based approach, it is important
to prove partial results, and to write down arguments which should convince
others of the security of the algorithm. Often such cryptographic algorithms
have security parameters (the number of steps, the size of the key, ...); it is
then very important to give lower bounds for these parameters, and to indicated
the value of the parameters which corresponds to a certain security level.
The next step is the publication of the algorithm at a conference, in a journal,
or in an Internet Request for Comment (RFC). This (hopefully) results in an
independent evaluation of the algorithm. Often more or less subtle °aws are then
discovered by other researchers. This can vary from small errors in proofs, to
complete security breaks. Depending on the outcome, this can lead to a small ¯x
of the scheme or to abandoning the idea altogether. Sometimes such weaknesses
can be found `in real-time' when the author is presenting his ideas at a conference,
but often evaluating a cryptographic algorithm is a very time consuming task; for
example, the design e®ort of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) has been more
than 17 man-years, and the open academic evaluation since has taken a multiple
of this e®ort. Cryptanalysis is quite destructive; in this respect it di®ers from
usual scienti¯c activities, even when proponents of competing theories criticize
each other.
Few algorithms survive the evaluation stage; ideally, this stage should last for
several years. The survivors can be integrated into products and ¯nd their way
to the market. Sometimes they are standardized by organizations such as NIST
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, US), IEEE, IETF, or ISO.
As will be explained below, even if no new security weaknesses are found,
the security of a cryptographic algorithm degrades over time; if the algorithm is
not modular, the moment will come when it has to be taken out of service.
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4.3 Brute Force Attacks Versus Shortcut Attacks
A detailed description of the evaluation procedures for cryptographic algorithms
is beyond the scope of this paper. We restrict ourselves to explaining the di®er-
ence between brute force attacks and shortcut attacks.
Brute Force Attacks. Brute force attacks are attacks which exist against any
cryptographic algorithm that is conditionally secure, no matter how it works
internally. These attacks only depend on the size of the external parameters of
the algorithm, such as the block length of a block cipher, or the key length of
any encryption algorithm or MAC. It is the task of the designer to choose the
external parameters in such a way that brute force attack are infeasible.
A typical brute force attack against an encryption algorithm or a MAC is
an exhaustive key search; it is equivalent to breaking into a safe by trying all
the combinations of the lock. The lock should be designed such that this is not
feasible in a reasonable amount of time. This attack requires only a few known
plaintext/ciphertext (or plaintext/MAC) pairs, which one can always obtain in
practice. It can be precluded by increasing the key length: adding one bit to the
key doubles the time for exhaustive key search. One should also ensure that the
key is selected uniformly at random in the key space.
On a standard PC, trying a single key for a typical algorithm requires a
few microseconds. For example, a 40-bit key (which is at present the maximum
value allowed by the US government for general purpose export) will be recovered
after a few hundred hours. If a LAN with 100 machines can be used, one can
¯nd the key in a few hours. For a 56-bit key such as DES (which can be exported
from the US under restrictive conditions), a key search requires a few months if
several thousand machines are available (as has been demonstrated in the ¯rst
half of 1997). However, if dedicated hardware is used, a di®erent picture emerges.
Recently a 250000 US$ machine has been built that ¯nds a 56-bit DES key in
about 50 hours [4]; the design (that required 50% of the cost) has been made
available for free.
One should also take into account \Moore's law" [23], which states that
computers double their speed every 18 months (for the same cost). This implies
that a 64-bit key, which o®ers a reasonable security level for the time being, is
probably not su±cient for data which needs to be protected for 10 years. Such
applications will need keys of at least 80 bits. As the cost of increasing the key
size is quite low, it is advisable to design new algorithms with variable key size
up to 128...256 bits.
There exist many other brute force attacks. For example, it turns out the
security of a block cipher in the CBC mode is decreased by what is called the
`matching ciphertext' attack. As a consequence of the birthday paradox, after
2n=2 encryptions with a single key, information on the plaintext starts to leak
(due to matches in the internal memory, which correspond to matching cipher-
texts). This attack can be a problem for present day block ciphers with a 64-bit
block length. It can only be prevented by designing new block ciphers with larger
block lengths (128 or more), or by changing the key frequently.
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Shortcut Attacks. Many algorithms are less secure than suggested by the size
of their external parameters. It is often possible to ¯nd more e®ective attacks
than trying all keys. Assessing the strength of an algorithm requires cryptanalytic
skills and experience, and often hard work. During the last 10 years powerful
new tools have been developed: this includes di®erential cryptanalysis [1], which
analyzes the propagation of di®erences through cryptographic algorithms, linear
cryptanalysis [16], which is based on the propagation of bit correlations, and fast
correlation attacks on stream ciphers [17].
The design of new algorithms according to the system-based approach is not
a memoryless process: when new cryptanalytic techniques are developed, the
cryptographers invent new designs which provide complete (or at least improved)
resistance against these new attacks. In this way cryptology develops by trial and
error procedures.
4.4 Public Versus Secret Algorithms
The open and independent evaluation process described in Sect. 4.2 o®ers a
strong argument for publishing all details of a cryptographic algorithm. Pub-
lishing the algorithm opens it up for public scrutiny, and is the best way to
guarantee that it is as strong as claimed. (Note that a public algorithm should
not be confused with a public-key algorithm.) Published algorithms can be stan-
dardized, and will be available from more than one source.
Nevertheless, certain governments and organizations prefer to keep their al-
gorithms secret. They argue (correctly) that obtaining the algorithm raises an
additional barrier for the attacker. Moreover, governments want to protect their
know-how on the design of cryptographic algorithms. (However, obtaining a de-
scription of the algorithm is often not harder than just bribing one person.)
This approach is acceptable, provided that su±cient experience and resources
are available for independent evaluation and re-evaluation of the algorithm.
4.5 Insecure Versus Secure Algorithms
In spite of the fact that secure cryptographic algorithms are available, which
o®er good performance, in many applications one encounters very insecure cryp-
tographic algorithms. For example, popular software sometimes `encrypts' data
by adding a constant key word to all data words. Several reasons can be indicated
for this:
{ one excuse is performance: while it is true that adding a constant will always
be faster than strong encryption, it should be noted that in software, current
encryption algorithms achieve between 20 and 400 Mbit/s; this is su±cient
for many applications;
{ legal and/or export restrictions: for national security reasons, certain coun-
tries (such as the USA) do not allow the export of strong encryption algo-
rithms; some countries (such as France) do not allow for strong encryption
within their territory (unless the keys are handed over to the government);
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{ commercial pressure: companies often rush their security solutions to market,
without allowing for su±cient time for the slow evaluation process;
{ evolution of computing power: the strength of a cryptographic algorithm
erodes over time because of Moore's law; often there exists a large inertia to
replace or upgrade an algorithm. A typical example is the DES, that is still
widely used in spite of a 56-bit key.
{ evolution of cryptanalysis: if designers are not aware of the latest develop-
ments in cryptanalysis, it is quite likely that their algorithms will not resist
these attacks. For example, the FEAL block cipher with 8 rounds, which was
published in 1987, can now be broken with only 10 chosen plaintexts.
5 Concluding Remarks
Securing an application should be based on a careful analysis of the risks and
vulnerabilities; this should lead to understanding the security requirements for
the data and the communication channels. The next step consists of selecting the
right mix of cryptographic algorithms to satisfy these requirements. A very im-
portant aspect is the underlying key management infrastructure, which ensures
that private and public keys can be established and maintained throughout the
system in a secure way. This is where cryptography meets the constraints of the
real world.
This paper only scratches the surface of modern cryptology, as the discussion
is restricted to a few basic techniques. Other problems solved in cryptography
include secure identi¯cation, secure sharing of secrets, electronic cash, and copy-
right protection. Many interesting problems are studied under the umbrella of
secure multi-party computation; examples are electronic elections, and the gen-
eration and veri¯cation of digital signatures in a distributed way.
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